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BEYOND BAKKE-THE USE
OF NONCOGNITIVE FACTORS
IN PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL
ADMISSIONS DECISIONMAKING
The professional school admissions decisionmaking process has
never been a totally objective exercise. Neither has it been limited to
consideration of applicants' intellectual abilities. The advantage of
being the offspring of alumni or faculty, for example, has long been
recognized.' However, as candidate selection has become a process of
distributing an increasingly scarce commodity, 2 the consideration of
noncognitive characteristics of applicants-those qualities not identifiable as demonstrated intellectual ability3-has been subjected to in1. See, e.g., Henkin, DeFunis: An Introduction, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 485 n.l
(1975); O'Neil, Racial Preferenceand Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L.
REV. 925, 926 (1974). But see Gellhorn & Hornby, Constitutional Limitations on
Admissons Procedures and Standards-Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L. REV.
975, 1006 (1974).
2. The explosion in professional school applications has been well-documented. The
number of medical school applications for the 1971-72 entering class was 29,172, while
41,400 were expected to apply for the 1978-79 entering class. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL SCHOOL COLLEGES, MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 197879: UNITED STATES AND CANADA 24 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS]. During the same period the number of first year medical school

seats rose from 12,361 to 16,200. Id. The Law School Admission Test (LSAT) was administered 133,230 times in 1976, almost tripling the 44,905 administrations a decade
earlier in 1966. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS & LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
COUNCIL, 77-78 PRELAW HANDBOOK 23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRELAW HANDBOOK]. The number of first year law school seats did not quite double in that decade,
growing to 39,996 from 24,167. Id.
However, the rise in professional school applications appears to be leveling off. For
instance, 1974 was the peak year for LSAT administrations, with 135,397 tests given. A
drop occurred in the following two years. Id. Indeed, the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) fears a "precipitous drop" in applicants which might make this
supply/demand issue a moot point. Chronicle of Higher Education, March 20, 1978, at
1, col. 3. The expense and length of preparatory and professional education along with
publicity of the difficulties of obtaining admission may discourage applicants. Id. Selfselection may also be taking place. "[T] he pattern of application for the past three years
suggests that the absolute number of applicants may decline while the comparative qualifications of those applicants remaining may be still stronger than today." PRELAW
HANDBOOK, supra at 23.
3. Noncognitive factors are nonintellectual personal traits. They are noncognitive
in the sense that they are not the product of a cognitive (thinking) activity by the possessor. They include characterizations of what a person is-tall, thin, Caucasian, female,
Oklahoman-and how a person is-motivated, moody, morose, malleable. See notes
37-40 and accompanying text infra.
Cognitive determinants are those numerical indicia which assign a value to an appli-

373

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:373, 1979

creasing judicial scrutiny. 4 If the number of professional school applicants continues greatly to exceed the number of available positions,
cant's academic or intellectual achievements or potential. They represent an attempt to
quantify the nature or extent of each applicant's intellectual capacities to facilitate
ranking.
Every American law and medical school uses some quantified measure of intellectual, or cognitive, ability. The most commonly considered cognitive determinants are
grade-point average and standardized scores from nationwide tests such as the Law
School Admission Test, PRELAw HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 29, and Medical College
Admissions Test, MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSONs REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 5.
4. The first modern admissions case to generate great publicity was DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wn. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Since then, the cases ofAlevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d
537 (1976), and Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1132, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), affd in part & rev'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), have examined the use of race as a factor in professional school candidate selection. See also
Glassman v. New York Medical College, 64 Misc. 2d 466, 315 N.Y.S.2d I (Sup. Ct.
1970). In Glassman the court upheld a public medical school's consideration of the
plaintiff's past mental history, including a voluntary mental commitment and suicide
attempts.
Defendants' rejection of plaintiff does not constitute a denial of due process and
the equal protection of the law. So long as rules and standards for admission are
fair and reasonable and are applied equally and fairly to all applicants, there is no
violation of due process and the equal protection of the law.
Id. at 4.
The alleged practice of favoring applicants whose acceptance might attract additional
benefits to the school (beyond the intellectual presence and payment of tuition presumably contributed by every student) was challenged in Steinberg v. Chicago Medical
School, 41 111. App. 3d 804, 354 N.E.2d 586 (1976). In Steinberg, the plaintiff alleged
that medical school applicants were being judged on their relationship to faculty members or potential benefactors of the school. The plaintiff argued such consideration was
in breach of contractual obligations, created by the school's acceptance of application
fees, to evaluate each candidate solely on the basis of criteria published by the private
school in informational material supplied candidates. The Illinois appellate court remanded the case for trial on the merits to determine if the school had actually judged
candidates on a basis not included in its published criteria. See also Donnelly v. Suffolk
University, 337 N.E.2d 920 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975). In Donnelly, the Massachusetts appellate court upheld the right of defendant private university to consider the recommendations of defendant's alumni, students, and friends in consideration of law school applicants, consistent with the university's written statements that " 'the [admissions]
committee chooses to evaluate each applicant's potential ... by studying all relevant evidence.' " Id. at 921. The court said such consideration did not constitute an "unfair"
practice, nor was it "deceptive" in light of the university's statement. Id.
The analysis of earlier admissions cases, which invalidated racially-exclusive admissions in segregated state professional schools, is inapplicable to the DeFunis-Bakke line
of cases. The admissions procedures challenged in the late 1940's denied applicants admission because they were black, not because the schools were full. Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). The demand for
professional education did not overwhelm the schools thirty years ago as it does now.
Two to three candidates now compete for each professional school seat, see note 2 supra, whereas in the mid-1950's at least one medical school had only 103 applicants for
150 places. Chronicle of Higher Education, March 20, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
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more frequent challenges to the use of noncognitive factors in admissions decisionmaking can be anticipated.
The Supreme Court's decision in Regents-of the University of California v. Bakke5 will not decrease the number of admissions suits. Although the Court in Bakke held that race could be given "competitive
consideration" in a "properly devised admissions program," 6 it did
not set out what such a program would entail or allow. By failing to
clarify the status of the applicant's rights7 or the appropriateness of
any admissions formula, 8 the Court has left the use of all noncognitive
selection factors vulnerable to challenge. After Bakke, rejected applicants with superior academic credentials will be on the lookout for
questionable noncognitive admissions criteria. The state of Washington's experience supports this prediction. The Washington Supreme

Court's approval of race-conscious professional school admissions in
DeFunis v. Odegaard9 has not dissuaded candidates from attacking
other aspects of the professional school selection process in the Wash-

ington state courts. Challenges to the University of Washington
School of Medicine's admissions policies have attacked consideration
of applicants' gender, residence, relationship to alumni or faculty, and

sociological, economic, or political beliefs. 10 If the response to De5. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). Six Justices wrote opinions in Bakke; there is no majority
opinion, but Justice Powell's opinion has received the most scrutiny. ACE-AALS CoMMITTEE ON BAKKE, THE BAKKE DECISION: IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ADMIS-

SIONS 17 (W. McCormack ed. 1978). Justice Powell agreed with Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun that under some circumstances race-conscious admissions could be valid. But Justice Powell disagreed with their conclusion that Davis' selection system was justifiable and instead supported the decision of Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist that the medical school's selection process
inappropriately considered race. The latter Justices, in an opinion written by Justice
Stevens, decided only that Davis' admission scheme violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). 98 S.Ct. at 2737-38.
6. 98 S.Ct. at 2764 (Powell, J.).
7. For example, Justice Powell notes that the "fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential
program is its disregard of individual rights," id., yet none of the opinions fully describe
the nature of that right. See Part I infra for a discussion of the potentially substantial nature of the applicant's "right," if not to professional school admission, then to appropriate admissions decisionmaking.
8. It is important to note that the Court in Bakke merely found Davis medical
school's admissions plan unlawful; it did not approve any particular selection formula.
Only Justice Powell, in a part of his opinion not joined by another Justice, suggested a
"safe" plan (Harvard College's "individualized" admissions process). 98 S.Ct. at 276266.
9. 82 Wn. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 415 U.S. 312 (1974).
10. Unsuccessful challenges to the University of Washington School of Medicine
admissions policies were raised in Rice v. Hogness, No. 783762 (King County Super.
Ct., Oct. 8, 1974) (female applicant challenged consideration of gender, race, and relationship to physicians or medical faculty members, and setting aside a certain number
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Funis is any indication, Bakke will, at most, merely shift the field of
battle in professional school admissions.
Admissions committees thus face a dilemma. Bakke exposes to increasingly certain challenge those admissions processes, especially
prevalent in law schools, that select white candidates solely or largely
on the basis of cognitive determinants such as grade-point average
(GPA) and standardized scores from nationwide tests (Board Scores),
reserving consideration of subjective noncognitive factors1 to certain
nonwhite applicants. Varying selection criteria in this way creates
"quotas" of the type struck down in Bakke. Considering "motivation"
an important quality in blacks but not in whites, for example, discriminates against motivated whites by denying them, on the basis of race,
consideration with regard to a quality admittedly considered relevant
by the admissions committee.' 2 Thus, in order to consider the subjective noncognitive characteristics of minority candidates the schools
must consider the subjective noncognitive characteristics of all candidates. At the same time, however, the consideration of noncognitive
factors, necessary to insure minority student participation in professional school education, has itself been subjected to increasing challenge.
The response of many schools to the admissions dilemma presented
by Bakke may be, as many minority leaders and educators fear,' 3 a
retreat to exclusive reliance on GPA and Board Scores. The "fairness"
facially apparent in comparison of such quantified indicia admittedly
of seats for residents of Idaho, Montana and Alaska under a regional health care agreement), Wells v. Hogness, No. 799118 (King County Super. Ct., Sept. 30, 1976) (female
applicant challenged consideration of race and gender and setting an admissions quota
under regional health care program; court believed plaintiff was discriminated against
on the basis of race but denied admission because applicant would not have been admitted even if not discriminated against), and McDonald v. Hogness, No. 817562 (King
County Super. Ct., June 21, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 5788-I (Ct. App., July 18.
1977) (male applicant challenged consideration of gender, race, and sociological, economic, or political beliefs and setting an admissions quota under a regional health care
agreement, and alleged the medical school's interview process is arbitrary and capricious).
Thus, the rejected Washington applicant with high cognitive determinants is still on
the lookout for other "questionable" noncognitive criteria.
11. See note 39 and accompanying text infra for a definition of subjective noncog-

nitive factors.
12. The fact of race is wholly determinative in the treatment accorded the candidate, and thus potentially suspect under Bakke. If the school thus limits consideration of
the motivated whites it would appear to infringe on the applicant's right to individualized consideration without regard to his race, considered important by Justice Powell in
Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2753.
13.

See, e.g., 6 BAKKE VERSuS REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 463

Slocum ed. 1978).
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avoids the specter of unconstitutional racial quotas. 14 However, it also
virtually assures the denial of professional school education opportunities to minorities, who historically have scored lower than whites ac15
cording to these traditional measures of intellectual ability.
This comment suggests that professional schools constitutionally
need not and, as a matter of policy, should not be deterred from considering at least some noncognitive criteria in admissions decisions.
An exhaustive constitutional analysis of the standard of inquiry appropriate for each noncognitive criterion is not attempted. Instead,
the comment shows in Part I that, regardless of the standard of scrutiny applied, any constitutional adjudication will involve some inquiry
into the relationship between the school's articulated admissions goals
and the admissions criteria used to implement them.
The focus of the comment, then, is to analyze those goals that are
typically advanced as legitimate by professional schools and to examine how consideration of various noncognitive criteria might help fulfill such goals. The comment in Part II examines the possible goals of
a responsible selection process. Part III-A discusses the use of some
objective noncognitive admissions criteria-age, gender, and residency-and their relationship to the goals set forth in Part 11.16 Part
III-B focuses on the policy reasons for considering subjective noncognitive admissions criteria. Finally, the comment concludes that con14.

There is no apparent "quota" or "goal" if all candidates are selected for all seats

through the same measure. See University of California, Berkeley, School of Law,
Report on Special Admissions at Boalt Hall After Bakke, 28 J. LEG. EDuc. 363, 377-78

(1977) (analysis of the "safeness" of such a plan).
15. Linn, Test Bias and the Prediction of Grades in Law School, 27 J. LEG. EDUC.
293,294 (1975); MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS, supranote 2, at 46.
16. The failure to articulate goals could have grave consequences if the admissions

process were analyzed under a means-oriented equal protection test:
Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes
that have a substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 21

(1972). Gunther proposes "that legislative means must substantially further legislative
ends" in order for a classification to be constitutional, and suggests that newer equal
protection decisions of the Supreme Court eschew most judicial value judgments about
state ends. Id. at 20.
Even if no equal protection challenge can be sustained, the school can not rationally
formulate an admissions policy without some articulation of the goals of the selection
process and the relationship of admissions criteria to them. See Gellhorn & Hornby, su-

pranote 1,emphasizing the professional school's duty to articulate admissions goals and
standards, and notes 77-85 and accompanying text infra,discussing inappropriate "hid-

den agendas" in the selection process.
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sideration of some noncognitive criteria, although exposing
admissions programs to court challenges, is an important way of assuring that professional schools fulfill their obligations to their respective professions and to society.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD APPLIED

Bakke focused on the equal protection requirement that admissions
criteria be related to legitimate admissions goals such as educational
17
and professional diversity and rectification of past discrimination.
The Court did not, however, specify the standard it would employ in
scrutinizing that relationship in nonracial classifications.' 8 Analysis of
equal protection challenges involves a judicial evaluation of the importance of the affected governmental and individual interests. Even
though such noncognitive criteria as sex, age, and residency have not
been found to support the exacting "suspect class" standard of inquiry, under the emerging flexible approach to equal protection analysis, the Court may be expected to require that professional schools
show at least some type of relationship between their articulated admissions goals and the selection criteria they employ. 19

17. 98 S. Ct. at 2757 (Powell, J.).
18. See note 19 infra for an analysis of the standards four justices might use in reviewing nonracial classifications.
19. Recent Supreme Court decisions which seem to employ an intermediate equal
protection standard include Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (gender classification); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender classification); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimacy classification); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128
(1972) (wealth classification); and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender classification).
Indeed, four justices have explicitly acknowledged the "new" equal protection
analysis. Justice Powell's first articulation of this new analysis, in a concurring opinion,
expressed some reluctance at its arrival. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11, n.*
(1976). But in Bakke his characterization of the effect of candidate classification on the
individual (nonadmission to the state professional school) as a "denial of the relevant
benefit--'meaningful participation in the educational program,' " had an obvious impact on his decision. 98 S. Ct. at 2756. Justice Brennan's Bakke opinion, which was
joined by Justice Marshall, analyzed admissions decisionmaking by applying the traditional strict scrutiny standard to racial classification. However, it reserved the question
of the standard applicable in other, nonracial admissions classifications, and both of
those justices have engaged in equal protection analysis that goes beyond the traditional
tests. Justice Marshall has long advocated use of a "spectrum of standards" varying with
the "constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn."
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan has stated that "it is clear that we employ not just one, or two,
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Therefore, more useful than a traditional analysis is one which recognizes the impact of governmental actions on individual interests at
a flexible level more exacting than that imposed by the rational basis
test but not as strict as that entailed by either strict scrutiny or the calcifying "intermediate scrutiny" given gender classifications. Although
actions embodying academic principles have historically been
considered relatively immune from scrutiny by the courts, 20 professional school usually represents the exclusive route to the rejected applicant's chosen profession. 2 1 This factor, coupled with the relative
but as my brother Marshall has so ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards in reviewing discriminations allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.'" Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 411,458 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens also did not reach the constitutional question presented in Bakke, and
thus did not set out the applicable equal protection standard. However, he has recently
suggested that equal protection analysis reflects a consistent judicial attempt to afford
justice on a case-by-case basis, and therefore he refrains from endorsing a set formula,
stating that "a careful explanation of the reasons motivating particular decisions may
contribute more to an identification of [the Court's standard] than an attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing terms." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
20. Judges have hesitated to strenuously review academic decisionmaking for fear
of the chilling effect judicial interference might have on scholastic freedom, Board of
Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1978); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968), and because of a self-professed judicial ignorance of academic matters:
"It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study."
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Judicial deference has been especially great in the case of medical schools. "[I] n matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely qualified by training and
experience to judge the qualifications of a student.. . . Courts are not supposed to be
learned in medicine and are not qualified to pass opinion as to the attainments of a student in medicine." Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agricultural College, 244 F.
Supp. 156, 160-61 (D. Vt. 1965) (upholding medical student's academic dismissal if not
arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith). See also Wong v. University of Cal., 15 Cal. App.
3d 826, 93 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1971) (upholding medical student's academic dismissal if not
arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith).
21. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra. Arguably, the rights affected by
the applicant's rejection are only economic because nonadmission will interfere with his
desire to enter a lucrative profession or force him to attend a private or out-of-state
school with higher tuition rates. See text accompanying notes 57-67 infra. Classifications with economic impacts have historically been analyzed through the rational basis
test. Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
Closely related, in this instance, is the state's broad power to regulate and limit the
persons allowed to practice in any number of professions. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 83 (1955) (opthamalogical services); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347
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scarcity of the professional school education, may justify judicial in22
quiry greater than that afforded by the traditional rational basis test.
U.S. 442 (1954) (medicine); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S.
608 (1935) (dentistry); McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920) (law). In the absence
of suspect criteria, professional licensing has been subject to a rational basis analysis.
Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957);
Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
The right to regulate access to a profession is never delegated to the state professional
school, except, arguably, in West Virginia, Mississippi, and Wisconsin, which extend the
"diploma" privilege to state law school graduates, allowing them to become members of
the bar without further examination. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 44, 81, 83 (West
1975). See Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (rejecting challenge
to Mississippi's diploma privilege). The question of regulation, however, is necessarily
considered in any contemporary discussion of professional education because it is impossible in most states to enter a profession without some formal instruction. See notes
32-33 and accompanying text supra.
The importance of professional school education to the person seeking admission
would never, alone, subject the entire candidate evaluation process to strict scrutiny. The right to education has not been considered fundamental since the Supreme
Court's decision in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
Professional school education is obvously not necessarily "to provide each child with an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights
of speech and of full participation in the political process." 411 U.S. at 37. However, the
result of candidate classification, nonadmission to the state professional school, is arguably "denial of the relevant benefit-meaningful participation in the educational program,' which had some impact on the Bakke decision. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2756 (Powell, J.). Rodriguez did not involve a total bar to educational facilities at any given level,
as nonadmission to professional school may. The court in Rodriguez specifically
reserved the question of the "fundamentality" of a right were a classification to occasion
"an absolute denial of educational opportunities." 411 U.S. at 37. The bar to state facilities might prompt stricter judicial review when coupled with the educational exclusivity
of professional employment, since nonadmission also may preclude employment in the
person's chosen field. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (" [T] he right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men" are generally considered substantial rights. Although found in
a due process case, the same principles were applied by the Court in In re Griffiths. 413
U.S. 717 (1973), which struck down a rule prohibiting aliens from becoming members
of a state bar.
22. It has been suggested that use of "traditional" rational basis analysis virtually
assures that the state classification will be upheld. Redish, PreferentialLaw School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343 (1974):
When applying this test, the Court has generally strained to find any conceivable
basis to justify a legislative classification, whether or not the legislature actually
considered that purpose. It is, therefore, not surprising that the number of reversals
of state action under this standard was traditionally infinitesimal.
Id. at 351-52 (citation omitted). This laxity is not true, however, of the newer types of
equal protection analyses, discussed in note 19 supra, even though they may analyze
classifications under the nominal "rational basis" test. As Justice White noted in his dissent in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972), the state should
be required to actually demonstrate that the challenged classification is rationally re-
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II.

LEGITIMATE GOALS FOR ADMISSIONS POLICIES

Although the goals have been articulated in many different ways,
the types of interests served in the admissions process can be generally
classified as academic, meritocratic, or professional.
A.

Academic Goals

Academic needs are fulfilled by selecting students who can perform
the required tasks 23 and who will stimulate classmates and professors
and attain added intellectual prestige for the school. Such students are
academically attractive for at least two reasons. Academicians place
24
an intrinsic value on intellectually rewarding learning situations.
Bright students and alumni also create "good press" for the school,
making it easier to get and retain facilities, funding, faculties, and
more bright students to perpetuate academic excellence. Obtaining
"educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student
body," expressed as a goal of the Davis medical school by Justice
Powell in Bakke,2 5 represents a third type of academic goal, that of
26
diversity.
B.

MeritocraticGoals

Meritocratic principles prompt professional schools to provide educational opportunities to those applicants who seem most deserving.
lated to an articulated governmental objective:
The Equal Protection Clause permits discriminations between classes but requires
that the classification bear some rational relationship to a permissible object sought
to be attained by the statute ...
Requiring the State to establish only that unequal treatment is in furtherance of
a permissible goal, without also requiring the State to show that the means chosen
to effectuate that goal are rationally related to its achievement, makes equal pro-

tection analysis no more than an empty gesture.
Id. at 67-68 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The newer equal protection analyses
discussed in note 19 supra, attempt to determine what sort of "fit" between goals and

classifications will be required by weighing the affected individual and state interests.
23. The original purpose of standardized tests, which were developed when most applicants were admitted to professional schools, was to weed out approximately the bottom 20 percent who were intellectually incapable of performing academically in professional school. Erdmann, Separating Wheat from Chaff. Revision of the MCA T, 47 J.

-MEo. EDuc. 747,748 (1972).
24.

Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2760-61 (Powell, J.).

25. Id. at 2757.
26. "The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and creation'-so essential to the
quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student
body." Id. at 2760.
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The meritocracy principle is widespread in allocation of benefits, as
noted by Professor Michael Shapiro:
[W] hat in fact counts as merit, at least in most Western cultures...
[includes] ability and aptitudes of various sorts, both intellectual and
"physical"; good works and accomplishments generally; effort or "trying"; industriousness; endurance, courage; physical strength and
beauty ....
All of these attributes ... are frequently used as criteria
27
for deciding who shall receive the rewards and riches of life.

Definition of merit will often draw the battle lines in admissions
criteria disputes. For instance, the plaintiff in Bakke asserted that it
was wrong to deny him admission to medical school while "reserving"
places in the entering class for members of minority groups because
Bakke performed better in traditional cognitive predictors of medical
school success-thus was more "deserving" of medical training-than
many of the students admitted under the challenged program. 28 Conversely, defenders of race-conscious admissions traditionally have
argued that all applicants who perform beyond a certain minimal
level of quantitative competence are equally qualified for professional
school, and that because the supply of education is limited, the
schools are justified in allotting seats to minorities because past discrimination "deserves" compensation. 29 In Bakke, such race-oriented
meritocracy is reflected in the school's effort to "counter the effects of
30
societal discrimination."

27. Shapiro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in DistributiveJustice and Utility Posed
by the New Biology, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 318, 322 (1974) (citations omitted). See also
Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955
(1974).
28. Brief for Respondents at 12, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct.
2733 (1978). See also DeFunis,82 Wn. 2d at 47, 507 P.2d at 1190 (Hale, J., dissenting);
Brief for Young Americans for Freedom as Amici Curiae at 6, 23, Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 13-17, 28-32, 45, Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 93 S. Ct. 2733 (1978); Brief for Respondents at 14-15, 42-44, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 415 U.S. 312 (1974).
The allotment argument is weakened by the practice in some schools of seriously considering minority candidates who fall below the minimal quantitative levels required
for applicants not considered under a special admissions program. Such was the case in
the challenged programs at both the University of Washington School of Law and the
University of California, Davis. School of Medicine, Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 43, 553 P.2d
1152, 1158, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680. 686 (1976); DeFunis, 83 Wn. 2d at 17-18. 507 P.2d at
1174.
30. 98 S. Ct. at 2757 (Powell, J.).
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C.

ProfessionalGoals

Finally, a school seeks to fulfill a commitment to the profession
and to the public by admitting those candidates who will best serve
the public in a professional capacity. One of the distinguishing characteristics of a professional school is that it usually represents the exclusive route to the student's chosen career. 3 1 Except for five states in
which it is still possible to become a lawyer solely by clerking, 32 every
31. Although law and medical school admissions schemes are the primary consideration of this comment, its reasoning could be applied to veterinary, dentistry, social
work, and architecture graduate programs to the extent of a court's characterization of
the school's responsibility for practical professional competence and an applicant's inability to gain access to the field without specialized institutional training. See notes 3234 and accompanying text infra.
Application of the comment's reasoning to training programs for public professions
such as fire fighting or law enforcement is doubtful. Training academies differ from
professional schools in their lesser emphasis on academic achievement as a means of
candidate selection and the greater importance of the academy applicant's quantifiable
physical characteristics. See, e.g., Comment, Height Standards in Police Employment
and the Question of Sex Discrimination,47 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 608-09 (1974).
The comment is generally limited to the admissions decisions of state professional
schools for two reasons. First, guarantees under the fourteenth amendment do not extend to private institutions. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73
(1972); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil RighWCases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (dismissing
private medical school applicant's complaint because the school's receipt of federal financial assistance, regulation by federal and state legislature, and role in assisting medical school graduates in securing employment did not make its activities those of the
state nor subject it to scrutiny as an "employment agency").
Second, even if the private school's admissions decisions could be construed as public
action because of the state and national accreditation process which law and medical
schools undergo, or because of its role in providing access to government-regulated employment, the private professional school does not have the implicit state sanction of a
professional school established and funded by the legislature. See Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1971) (state liquor licensing scheme not enough, standing
alone, to make licensed private club's racially discriminatory practices state action, and
thus subject to equal protection clause.) See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406
F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976):
[N] either the receipt of state or federal financial aid assistance, nor the existence
of a detailed scheme of state regulation, will be sufficient to bring defendants' actions within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Civil Rights Act of 1964] in the absence of a showing that the state significantly participated in the decision to deny
plaintiff admission to the medical school.
Id. at 1257.
32. The five states in which a person can become a lawyer solely by clerking are
California (four years of law office study), Mississippi (two years of law office study),
Vermont (four years of law office study), Virginia (three years of law office study), and
Washington (four years of law office study as a registered law clerk). RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 10, 44, 74, 76, & 79 (West 1975). See also, Lewin, The Unhappy

Booker, STUDENT LAWYER, Sept. 1978, at 20 (regarding the unpopularity this method of
becoming a lawyer has with other bar associations).
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new doctor and lawyer in this country must have been accepted by,
and usually graduated from, a professional school before he or she
can be certified. 33 The professional school's role was expressed by an
amicus curiae in DeFunis v. Odegaard: "A school of law is not solely
a graduate school in law. It is a professional school responsible for
34
training students who wish to enter the legal profession."
In Bakke, Justice Powell rejected as "facially invalid" a race-conscious professional purpose of "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in ... the medical profession," 35 echoing Justice Douglas' statement in his DeFunis dissent that "[t] he
purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce black
lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews,
Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for
36
Americans."
III.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF NONCOGNITIVE FACTORS
TO LEGITIMATE ADMISSIONS GOALS

This section will examine some of the noncognitive factors a professional school might consider in pursuit of the goals outlined above.
All such criteria are either objective or subjective in nature and can be
distinguished by the ways in which they are manifested by the candidate and identified by the school. Objective noncognitive factors can
be defined in terms of a status. 37 Once established, they exist indepen33.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION & LICENSURE IN THE

U.S., 1975 (1977); RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West 1975).
34. Brief of Deans of Antioch School of Law as Amici Curiae at 5, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The unique responsibility of the professional school to produce doctors or lawyers, and not just persons knowledgable in medicine or law, makes
it important that the school select applicants with the attributes necessary to become
professionals, and not just those with the necessary intellectual apparatus. See generally
Part III-B infra.
The schools acknowledge this duty. For instance, the American Association of Law
Schools lists its purpose as "the improvement of the legal profession through legal education." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, ASSOCIATION INFORMATION, Feb.
1978, at 1. The Association of American Medical Colleges has as its purpose "the advancement of medical education and the Nation's health. In pursuing this purpose, the
Association works with many [entities and individuals] interested in strengthening the
quality of medical education at all levels, the search for biomedical knowledge, and the
application of these tools to provide effective health care." ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES, 1977-78 AAMC DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION 6
(1977).
35. 98 S. Ct. at 2757.
36. 416 U.S. at 342.
37. Status is the "capacities and incapacities which determine a person to a given
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dent of any judgment by the professional school admissions
committee. 38 Subjective noncognitive factors, on the other hand, are
based on the admissions committee's subjective perception of the applicant. 39 They include qualities which must be inferred from the applicant's activities and which cannot be directly tested. 40 The effectiveness of each type of noncognitive factor in advancing legitimate
admissions goals will be examined independently.
A.

Objective Noncognitive Factors

1.

Gender

Giving women applicants different consideration than that given
men may be justified on academic, meritocratic, and professional
grounds. The goals furthered by gender-conscious admissions decisions are similar to those served by race-conscious selections. 4 1 Acaclass," not temporary or terminable at will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1580 (rev. 4th ed.
1968). For example, a person is a man or a woman, belonging to one of a definable
number of racial or ethnic groups, and has only one domicile at a time for any one purpose.
38. Objective noncognitive factors include race, gender, age, and residency. Contrast with subjective noncognitive factors, discussed in Part 111-B infra. The professional
school need not "decide" a candidate's sex, age, or race. Most objective noncognitive
factors are established by self-identification, i.e., the applicant indicates the pertinent
status in completing the professional school application.
Race will not be examined in this comment. The use of race in admissions decisions
has been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere. See, e.g., O'Neil, supra note 1; Redish, supra
note 22.
39. They are subjective in the sense of being colored by the experiences and philosophies of members of the admissions committee, who must look for the desired subjective
noncognitive factors. This "bias" raises the most common reason given for not considering subjective noncognitive factors. See, e.g., Gough, Nonintellectual Factorsin the Selection and Evaluation of Medical Students, 42 J. MED.EDUC. 642 (1967). But see text
accompanying notes 84-85 infra (regarding the "bias" inherent in overuse of cognitive
determinants in admissions decisions).
40. The activities can be either those in the past which the candidate reports in the
admissions process or the candidate's behavior in admissions-oriented activities such as
writing statements or interviewing. Thus, they differ from cognitive determinants which
purport to express intellectual ability in a quantified sense. See note 3 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 42-46 infra. For a similar analysis of purposes
served by race-conscious admissions, see DeFunis, 82 Wn. 2d at 34-37, 507 P.2d at
1182-85; Redish, supra note 22, at 373 -94.
Gender-based admissions classifications are used less frequently than racial classifications. As the use of cognitive determinants has increased in admissions decisions,
women have been able to demonstrate parity with men in quantifiable measures of intelligence. Dub6 & Johnson, Study of U.S. Medical School Applicants, 50 J. MED. EDUC.
1015, 1022-26 (1975) (acceptance percentage for women higher than men); Cowell &
Swineford, Law School Admissions Test-Comparison of Test Analysis Datafor White
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demically, the presence of women in the school provides a different
student perception of a male-dominated profession. 42 Gender-conscious employment practices make it more likely that women graduates will attain significant positions in their respective professions,
which will in turn bring prestige to the school. 43 The historical limitation of professional education opportunities for women 44 and a social
climate which discourages women from taking advantage of existing
opportunities 45 raise meritocratic arguments; the female applicant
Male Candidates with White Female Candidates, in LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL.
ANNUAL COUNCIL REPORT 379, 379-80 (1972) ("scores show the women to be a... [verbally] superior and more homogeneous group than the men"). This has led most professional schools to ignore gender in the selection process. PRELAW HANDBOOK, supra note
2; MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2. However, although the
number of women enrolled in professional schools has doubled in medicine and tripled
in law since 1969, less than a quarter of present professional student bodies is female.
Chronicle of Higher Education, January 16, 1978, at 15, col. 1.
42. This type ofjustification was expressed by two medical education researchers:
The educational process from medical school through residency training reinforces
the values of aggressiveness, impersonality, and distance. These qualities are related to the complaints most frequently directed against physicians. In a society
which links masculinity with these traits and feminity with empathy, kindness, and
intuitiveness, it might be helpful in improving the image and the life of the doctor
to include more women in the profession. None of these traits are intrinsically
masculine or feminine but are human qualities. Since, in our culture, men are
given less permission to be emotionally expressive, contact and work with women
whose acculturation allows them to express emotion might enable men to have the
freedom of acknowledging and expressing affects.
Nadelson & Notman, The Woman Physician, 47 J. MED. EDUC. 176, 183 (1972).
43. Employers may prefer female over male graduates of the same caliber in order
to fulfill formal or informal "quotas." But 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6) (1977), although offering administrative support for preferential hiring of minorities, does not include women
in this category. The lack of employment opportunities for persons of one sex in a particular field is precluded as a justification of discrimination against members of that
gender in education programs in 45 C.F.R. § 86.7 (1977).
44. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873):
[T] he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). See also Weisberg, Barred from the
Bar: Women and Legal Education in the United States 1870-1890, 28 J. LEG. EDUC.
485 (1977).
45. Two authors note:
Our community socialization systems, which include friends, family, counselors,
and physicians, may act directly and indirectly throughout the lives of women and
minorities to provide [passive discouragement from considering medicine as a
career]. It has a negative effect, whether or not this is intended.
Johnson & Sedlacek, Retention by Sex and Race of 1968-1972 U.S. Medical School Entrants, 50 J. MED. EDUC. 925, 931 (1975). See also Barnes, Women and Entrance to the
Legal Profession, 23 J. LEG. EDUC. 276, 285-86 (1970).
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who demonstrates intellectual ability comparable to a male candidate
is arguably more deserving both because her gender warrants retribution for past wrongs and because she personally has overcome more
psychic barriers in rising to her present level of achievement. Finally,
candidates of one sex may be thought more likely to possess subjec-

tive noncognitive factors, such as empathy or aggressiveness, consid-

46
ered important to professional competence.
The Supreme Court has often found classifications based on
stereotypical notions of gender-based behavior to be, unconstitutional. 47 The most recent decisions of the Court in this area employ
an intermediate standard of review under which gender classification
must have a substantial relation to an important governmental objective.48 Although gender classification arguably has a "substantial relation" to academic and meritocratic goals, whether such affirmative
action goals for women are "important governmental objectives" is
unclear after Bakke.4 9 Conversely, the professional purposes of pre-

46. If it is believed that aggressiveness is a desirable quality in lawyers, that belief,
coupled with evidence that men tend to be more aggressive, might lead to gender-conscious admissions decisions justified by professional goals. Such an attitude is, however,
reminiscent of the outmoded concepts expressed by Justice Bradley in his concurring
opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). [I] t is not every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every
calling and position. . . . [1] t is within the province of the legislature to ordain
what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall
receive the benefit of those energies and responsibilities, and that decision and
firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.
Id. at 141. Of the previously articulated gender-conscious goals, only this justification
could be raised for admissions biased toward males. See Nadelsom & Notman, supra
note 42 (development of this argument supporting female-oriented admissions to medical school).
47. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) ("Reed v. Reed [404 U.S. 71
(1971)] . . . provided the underpinning for decisions that have invalidated statutes employing gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classification."). In Weinberger v. Weisenfield, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Court
prohibited the use of "archaic and overboard" generalizations about the status of
women to deny them, or their dependents, governmental entitlements.
48. In one case the Court stated: "To withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
49. A "reverse discrimination" claim by a male alleging professional school rejection because of gender classification has not yet been addressed in the courts. The Supreme Court decision in Bakke did not invalidate race-conscious admissions per se.
Nevertheless, since the status of women as special recipients of fourteenth amendment
protection is more precarious than that of racial minorities, the status of gender-based
classification would still be in doubt even if the Supreme Court has affirmed any raceconscious admission scheme in Bakke. The Supreme Court's refusal to declare gender a
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dicting competence may be an "important governmental objective,"
but gender classification has no "substantial relation" to that goal. 50
Regardless of their constitutionality, gender classifications seem an
extremely clumsy means of creating diversity in the classroom, rewarding those candidates who have overcome adversity, or insuring
the presence of "feminine" or "masculine" qualities in the profession.
Any qualities important to these professional school admissions goals
can be best identified directly, and not through perpetuating gross
gender-based generalities.
2.

Age

The policy, particularly prevalent in medical schools, of favoring
younger candidates makes age important in many professional school
admissions decisions. 5 ' Consideration of age arguably serves both acsuspect classification, see cases cited in notes 47-48 supra, attests to a belief that the
goals of gender-conscious allocation of governmental benefits are not as important as
those served by racial classifications. Although the historical discrimination against
women is arguably as "invidious" as that practiced against racial minorities, the judicial
precedent for adoption of gender-specific affirmative action is not as strong as that behind race-specific remedial measures. For example, consider cases such as Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1968), approving, and in some cases
requiring, race-conscious state action to promote eventual racial equality. No similar
measures have been required to hasten gender equality. But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding a property tax exemption for widows only through acknowledgment of present sexual inequality).
50. As noted in text accompanying notes 47 & 48 supra, professional competence
would be better served by seeking out the desired traits rather than assuming they are
gender-based. Thus gender classification is less desirable. Administrative convenience
alone would be insufficient to justify competency-based gender classification. Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
51. At least 28 medical schools specifically consider the age of applicants in candidate selection. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY 76
(1977). In addition, older applicants are implicitly discouraged from applying to medical school:
Except in very unusual circumstances, medicine is not recommended as a second
career. . . . Individuals who would be 28 years old or older by the time of matriculation in medical school are urged to consider these data carefully before continuing premedical preparation or plans for application to medical school.
MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 14.
Although the University of California, Davis, admissions information states "[n] o
age limitations have been specified," id. at 85, Allan Bakke's rejection from medical
school was probably more a result of his age than his race. Only 18.2% of medical
school applicants 32 to 37 were admitted in 1975-76 as compared with 42.3% of those
applying at the age of 21 to 23. More dramatic is the contrast between the 8.1% of those
38 or over and 56.5% of those 20 or under at the time of application who gained seats in
medical schools. Id. at 15.
Research shows no overt age discrimination in law school admissions.
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ademic and professional goals. 52 Youth is thought to be desirable in
providing the stamina necessary for the academic rigors of professional education and in insuring a long professional life, especially for
the graduated physician.5 3 Ostensibly, the heavy public subsidy of
professional education is best spent on those who can return many
years of career service.
A recent Supreme Court decision analyzing the constitutionality of
state age classifications approved a mandatory retirement age because
of its rational relationship to the state's professional purpose. The
Court upheld the forced retirement of a state trooper in Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia54 because of the state's right to seek
"to protect the public by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police." 55 Rejection from professional school obviously differs
from forced retirement. However, in professional school age classifications, a presumptive finding of future unfitness is made 30 or 40
years before the predicted event. Use of such age classifications for
professional and academic purpose might be inappropriate, particularly if physicians develop a more accurate means of forecasting physical and mental health in their potential colleagues. Indeed, preferring
a 22-year-old with an extensive history of tobacco and alcohol use
over a 30-year-old long distance runner would border on irrationality
56
today with our present knowledge of life expectancies.
52. Age serves at least two different functions in admissions decisionmaking. It can
aid interpretation of a quantified indicator such as GPA or Board Score used to insure
minimal academic competence, or it can be used for professional, public service reasons.
In the first use, age and the candidate's consequently earlier academic career are less
classification criteria than factors affecting the validity of cognitive determinants. The
recent phenomenon of grade inflation may lead some professional schools to consider
the time when a candidate's grades were earned, thus discounting the importance of the
lower GPA of an older applicant who was in college when the median grade was a C
rather than a B. The older rejected candidates may demand age classification with regard to the this purpose while challenging its use for the second goal.
Favoring younger candidates is the type of classification considered in the text accompanying notes 85-89 infra.
53.

MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 14.

54. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
55. Id. at 314.
56. Cf. Simon, Mortality Among Medical Students, 1947-1967, 43 J. MED. EDUC.
1175, 1181 (1968) (suggesting preadmission physical examinations).
The possibility of more accurate prediction of life expectancy raises a question of the
propriety of using genetic data in allocating professional school resources. Professional
goals could probably not support eugenic candidate selection, particularly if the lifeshortening trait was ethnically selective. Tension between the school's meritocratic and
professional goals would appear to be at its greatest in such a situation, when "merit' is
not considered an inherent trait. See generally Shapiro, supra note 27.
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Residency

A professional school's consideration of applicants' residency can
result in a challenge to the selection process.5 7 Many professional

schools have quotas for state residents while others do not consider
residency at all. 58 Ignoring residency can be justified on academic di57. The school's failure to consider residency was one of the main thrusts of the
plaintiff's original pleadings in DeFunis. Complaint, DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727
(King County Super. Ct., Oct. 18, 197 1), reprinted in I DEFuNIs VERSUS ODEGAARD AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON 12-18 (Ginger ed. 1974). The argument was the princi-

pal basis for Justice Hale's dissent in the Washinton Supreme Court. DeFunis, 82 Wn.
2d at 50-51,507 P.2d at 1192.
Residency differs from the objective factors examined thus far in that a determination
of residency will involve at least a minimal subjective deduction by the professional
school. The status is generally the result of a judgment based on criteria developed by
some state educational entity. Since the characterization of an applicant as a nonresident often means automatic rejection, see note 62 and accompanying text infra, due
process may require some sort of hearing. The Supreme Court has struck down the irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for tuition purposes, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973). The Court's analysis has been challenged as creating the opportunity for arbitrary substantive judgments about the constitutionality of any classification. See, e.g.,
Comment, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449
(1975); Sewell, Conclusive andlor Substantive Due Process of Law, 27 OKLA. L. REV.
151 (1974). In addition, its applicability to other governmental activities has been severely limited by Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) ("irrebuttable presumption"
of nondependency for purposes of denial of social security benefits upheld). Nevertheless, the precedential value of Vlandis in the limited residency admission area would
make it difficult to justify a statutory residency determination scheme that did not allow
the candidate "the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident" when residency was the sole criterion for classification. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452.
Vlandis was distinguished in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
In any case, it is clear the administrative convenience of a mechanistic residency formula need not be sacrificed. The state can set up any criteria rationally related to the
goal of determining residency once that goal is deemed appropriate. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (upholding social security disability formula). But the
school should be prepared to justify the nonresidency classification on the basis of candidate-identified characteristics. See Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring
Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60, 8487 (1976) (developing argument for requiring reasons when expected status is changed
or denied through governmental action). For instance, a medical school candidate, relying on his supposed resident status when applying to the state professional school, would
be entitled to an explanation of the action which denied him residency consideration
and, consequently, admission. See generally MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 10.
58. Almost half of the 63 state law schools and all state medical schools prefer state
resident candidates. In some schools, a certain number of seats are expressly reserved
for candidates of certain states or regions. PRELAW HANDBOOK, supra note 2; MEDICAL
SCHOOL ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2. In addition, two regional plans, estab-

lished by interstate compacts, set aside places in the medical schools of the University of
Washington and the University of Vermont for students from neighboring states with no
medical school facilities. Id. at 13-14.
The practice of preferring medical school candidates from rural or inner-city back-
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versity, meritocratic, and professional grounds. Preferring state residents may advance certain meritocratic and professional goals, but it
clearly diminishes academic diversity.
The classification question is more clearly presented by challenges
to the practice of many state law schools and all state medical schools
of preferring state residents. The schools' purposes are defended as
being attuned to the states' interests in professional competence; the
role of a state school as a provider of doctors or lawyers for the state
is emphasized 5 9 and the economic contribution of resident applicants
and their families is seen as a meritorious attribute deserving special
60
consideration.
A state's right to afford residents preferential tuition has been repeatedly upheld as rationally related to the legitimate state interest in
providing educational facilities primarily for its citizens. 61 However,
grounds, see Dubd & Johnson, supra note 41, at 1028, reflects professional distributive
concerns similar to those addressed by state- and region-biased plans. The goals set forth
in the text accompanying this note are analogous to the goals of geography-conscious
candidate selection, which is usually concerned with providing professionals for specific
geographic or economic areas.
59. See, e.g., MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 10.
60. Justice Hale, dissenting in DeFunis,stated:
The major resources of a state university school of law foanded, maintained and
operated by the people of this state and deriving most of its subsistence from their
taxes and good will, designed to enable them and their children to obtain a professional education which a substantial number of them could not afford were they
studying in private school . . . should be devoted . . . to the people of the commonwealth who founded and perpetually have supported it.
82 Wn. 2d at 50-51, 507 P.2d at 1192.
61. "[A] State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of
its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such
institutions on a preferential tuition basis." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53
(1973). See also Kelm v. Carlson, 473 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1973) (stating that higher nonresident tuition does not infringe on a fundamental right); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.
Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (upholding one-year waiting period to acquire resident status for tuition); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d
430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, appealdismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1969) (upholding state's right to
distinguish between residents and nonresidents in tuition fees).
A few states have also attempted to limit out-of-state student enrollment throughout
their higher education systems. See generally L. GLENNY & T. DALGLISH, PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES, STATE AGENCIES, AND THE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY IN DECLINE

70

(1973). The 15% quota on nonresident admissions at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill was upheld in Rosenstock v. Board of Governors, 423 F. Supp. 1321,
(M.D.N.C. 1976):
Judging the classification under the rational basis test, the Court believes the State
has shown reasonable grounds for the differentiation between in-state and out-ofstate applicants. The University. . . is a state institution of higher education created for the citizens of the State. Of equal importance is the fact that the University
is continuously and substantially supported by the citizens of the State . ...
Id. at 1326.
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the residency tuition cases were brought by nonresidents who were
not precluded from attending state schools, albeit at higher cost. Medical schools which do not consider out-of-state applicants at all 62 discriminate against nonresidents to a much greater degree, and courts
might consider admissions challenges more seriously than tuition
challenges, particularly when the nationwide practice of preferring
residents creates a disparate number of professional school seats for
63
citizens of different states.
Conversely, the state professional school may choose to ignore
state residency. 64 The state law school having or seeking a "national"
reputation typically desires geographic diversity in its student body to
attract well-qualified students and professors and to provide fresh
viewpoints for its resident students. 6 5 It will follow meritocratic principles in selecting students regardless of the geographic accident of
residence. The school will argue that professional competence requires choosing the most promising applicants, and state residence
has nothing to do with protecting the caliber of the profession on a
66
nationwide basis.
62.

MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2. at 14.

63. In 1975, over 50% of medical school applicants from Wyoming, North Dakota,
and South Dakota gained admission. In the same year, less than 30% of those candidates for medical education from California, Alaska, Utah, and Arizona were accepted.
Dub6 & Johnson, Study of U.S. Medical School Applicants, 1974-75, 51 J. MED. EDUC.
877, 886 (1976).
Of particular importance in residency cases is the right to travel, which has been declared "basic" by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
(striking down residency requirement for medical treatment): Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down durational residency requirements for voters): Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down one-year residency requirement for
welfare benefits absent a compelling state interest). Of course, the rejected professional
school applicant is still free to move from state to state, even if not as a medical or law
student. Nonadmission does not deprive an individual of subsistence or the right to
vote.
64. Over half of state law schools do not give preference to state residents. PRELAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 2.
65. "National" or "regional" professional schools have reputations extending beyond their state borders. "National" law schools often offer instruction which is not
geared to the peculiarities of the state in which the school is located. The academic urge
to quantify leads to numerous ranking devices to assess the relative reputations of professional schools. See, e.g., Chronicle of Higher Education, March 20, 1978, at 12, col. I
(rankings of medical schools); JURIs DOCTOR, Dec. 1976, at 17 (rankings of law schools).
66. Harder to justify is preference for minority nonresident candidates in an effort
to increase the pool of qualified minorities when the applications of white nonresidents
are not considered. This creates a race-based classification of the type discussed in text
accompanying note 12 supra, in which relevant criteria are considered for one race but
not for another. Justice Hale's dissent to DeFunis rested on his perception of similar
consideration of candidates at the University of Washington law school. 82 Wn. 2d at
47, 507 P.2d at 1189. Whether preferential consideration of nonresidents absent a pro-
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Residence-blind admissions are related to the interests of a law
school with a national perspective, but the legitimacy of that goal and
its effect on the applicant can be attacked on policy grounds. The
harm to the rejected candidate is twofold: First, the economic rights
of the applicant are affected when she is not given preferential access
to the state school because she (or, more often, the candidate's parents) is a state taxpayer and monetarily supports the school.67 Second,
the harm to the rejected applicant is aggravated if favorable consideration is given resident applicants by public law schools in other states.
The student cannot gain admission to his state school because admission standards are not lower for residents, but is precluded from
attending another state's law school.
B.

Subjective Noncognitive Factors

Subjective noncognitive factors serve a wide spectrum of admissions goals. The great variety of the factors precludes individual analysis, but a few of the most sought after characteristics are "good
moral character, ' 68 "motivation," 69 and "empathy. '7 0 These characfessional goal such as increasing minority representation would be invalid is uncertain.
Clearly, preference for less quantifiably qualified nonresidents based solely on goals of
"national" reputation or classroom diversity would be harder to justify. Besides presenting an affront to state goals of insuring professional competence and rewarding taxbased merit, see note 60 and accompanying text supra, such a policy would arguably be
irrational with regard to the purported academic goal since less qualified candidates
would presumably bring less prestige to the school regardless of their geographic backgrounds. But see note 90 infra (questioning the relationship of academic ability to the
type of competence that might bring prestige to the school).
67. This argument was the basis for joining Marco DeFunis' wife and parents as
plaintiffs in DeFunis, 82 Wn. 2d at 13, 507 P.2d at 1171. Their standing to join was
questioned in Pollak, DeFunis Non Est Disputandum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 495, 495 n.2
(1975).
68. The requirement of "good moral character' reflects professional concerns; it is
often defined negatively in terms of a lack of contact with the criminal law or other punishing entities of the state. See PRELAw HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 26. Some law schools
claim they do not consider such indicia of "character" but warn that prospective applicants might have trouble meeting bar requirements. Id. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), the Court placed constitutional limitations on
"character" requirements: "'Mere unorthodoxy [in the field of political and social
ideas] does not as a matter of fair and logical inference negative "good moral character."' " Id. at 244 (citation omitted). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252,
262-63 (1957).
69. Motivation is thought to ensure completion of arduous training and a spirited
professional career. In addition, motivation is an integral part of any puritan notion of
merit. Shapiro, supranote 27, at 322.
70. Empathy has become extremely important in medical school admissions. The
necessity of caring in health profession training and practice, and the superiority of can-
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teristics reflect the general tenor of subjective considerations; they
concern the candidate's attitude about himself, 7 1 the profession, 72 and
those served by the profession. 73 Generally, classification by subjective noncognitive characteristics serves academic goals by injecting diversity into the professional school community and by directing selection of those most likely to succeed in school.74 To all but the most
recalcitrant cognitive snob, nonintellectual personal traits have some
bearing on a person's merit.7 5 Long hours, ethical decisions bearing
didates possessing empathy, have been raised as justification for its use in selection processes. See, e.g., Wingard & Williamson, Grades as Predictors of Physicians' Career
Performance: An Evaluation Literature Review, 48 J. MED. EDuc. 311, 314 (1973); Nadelson & Notman, supra note 42, at 183.
In the practice of law, studies indicate that client satisfaction depends more on interpersonal relationships with their lawyers than on hard-nosed battle techniques. D. RoSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 51 (1974). To the extent the lawyer

must provide advice and counseling, her role would appear to require the social effectiveness needed by doctors in their counseling of patients.
71. This is often exemplified by "good moral character." Maturity may reflect a
similar attitude about the person's worth and purpose in life. Medical students with
fewer personal problems tend to perform more satisfactorily in academic work.
Golden, Marchionne. & Silver, Fifty Medical Students: A Comparison with "Normals,"
42J. MED. EDUC. 146, 152 (1967).
72. Motivation shows a desire to enter the profession, thus reflecting the candidate's
attitudes about his or her chosen field.
73. Empathy is important because it predicts a capacity to relate with patients or
clients in a professional setting. See note 70 supra. In addition, the applicant's perception of a professional's duty to provide medical or legal services to indigents or to rural
areas would possibly be relevant to this concern.
74. Motivation may "'cancel out" the effect of lesser intellectual ability manifested
in poor cognitive determinants. Although this theory has been repeatedly raised by advocates of race-conscious admission, research has not demonstrated an underprediction
of culturally deprived students' grades by LSAT scores. Schraeder & Pitcher, The Interpretation of Law School Admission Test Scores for Culturally Deprived Candidates:
An Extension of the 1966 Study Based on Five Additional Law Schools, in LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSION COUNCIL, ANNUAL COUNCIL REPORT 432 (1972); Linn, supra note 15, at 320.

Such a result would, of course, be expected, since the skills required on the LSAT are so
similar to those tested in law school. See note 90 infra.
More generally, subjective noncognitive factors have been seen as a way of insuring
difference in an intellectually homogenous group. See Erdmann, supra note 23, at 748.
In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), Texas' segregated law school system was
struck down because "a substantial and significant segment of society" was excluded
from the black student body, thus precluding racial diversity in the school. Id. at 634.
See also Brief of the President and Fellows of Harvard College as Amicus Curiae at 25,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (" [T] he Fourteenth Amendment generally
permits an institution to make an applicant's probable contribution to the diversity of
the student body the primary standard of selection once there is promise of satisfactory
academic performance."); Griswold, Some Observationson the DeFunis Case, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 512, 518 (1975).
75. A kindhearted, socially aware, personable genius presumably has more merit as
a human being than a selfish, myopic, obnoxious genius. Cf. Gough, Nonintellectual
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on other persons' lives, and a sense of social commitment are hallmarks of the "professions. '76 Thus, the occupations to which the desired training leads reveal the importance of some nonacademic factors to professional competence.
There arises here the problem of a "hidden agenda," goals which
actually direct decisionmaking but which admissions committee members do not acknowledge to others (or, sometimes, even to themselves). Less legitimate goals in the state school admissions process
might include (1) support for political or economic philosophies, for
example, corporate capitalism in the law school or nonsocialized
medicine in the medical school,7 7 or (2) a desire to keep the professional school serene by weeding out potential academic troublemakers.
This desire for academic serenity is reflected in a recent study of
law students by Professors Paul Carrington and James Conley. After
presenting data indicating that one out of every seven law students at
the University of Michigan is "alienated," they suggest:
One potential solution would involve the utilization of the admissions
process. It is at least possible that the major sources of alienation are
the psychological characteristics students bring with them to law
school. If such factors could be identified prior to admission, the
school could reject applicants who were likely candidates for alienation.78
The professors acknowledge the difficulty of spotting potential alien-

Factorsin the Selection and Evaluation of Medical Students, 42 J. MED. EDUc. 642, 649
(1967); Korman, Stubblefield, & Martin, Patterns of Success in Medical School and

Their Correlates,43 J. MED. EDUC. 405 (1968) (achievement- and grade-oriented, aloof
individuals with poor peer esteem and few humanistic qualities usually possessed high
cognitive determinants).
76.

See note 121 and accompanying text infra. That is, a profession is not a wholly

academic pursuit requiring only intellect. Consalus, The Law School Admission Test
and the Minority Student, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 501. See also note 31 supra.

77.

See Brief for Petitioner, McDonald v. Hogness, No. 817562 (King County Su-

per. Ct., June 21, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 5788-I (Ct. App. July 18, 1977). Plaintiff,

a rejected medical school applicant, claimed his first amendment rights were abridged
by the University of Washington medical school's admissions process, which puts heavy
emphasis on the candidates' performance in admissions interviews. McDonald alleged
his politically-based disapproval of socialized medicine, a view that was brought out in
his admissions interview, was one of the reasons for his rejection. He further contended
that any unfavorable decision by the medical school on the basis of that political opinion
improperly limited his fundamental rights to free speech. Regarding a potential justification for consideration of such beliefs, see note 73 supra.
78. Carrington & Conley, The Alienation of Law Students, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 887,
898 (1977).
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ated law students,7 9 but the truly disturbing aspect of their advocated
admissions criteria, and criteria such as example (2) above, is the inappropriateness of injecting extraneous personal views about the
school itself into the selection process with little justification beyond
80
the difficulties "troubled" students create in the classroom.
Such goals would not, at any rate, appear to be valid. The Supreme
Court has expressly forbidden political decisionmaking, such as that
suggested by example (1), with regard to bar admission. 81 The deliberate exclusion or overrepresentation of candidates with a particular
type of personality or with particular religious, moral, or political beliefs could not serve the academic, meritocratic, or professional goals
discussed above.82 Therefore, gross abuse of admissions decision83
making power will be subject to some review.
However, an admissions selection process inevitably reflects school
officials' backgrounds and beliefs. This may be the price of allowing
some exercise of discretion. Indeed, even the quantitatively oriented
admissions standards used in most professional schools are no less
geared to faculties' personal biases. Admissions committees are usually made up of professors, who are generally academically oriented.
When evaluating candidates, they can be expected to emphasize those
quantifiable characteristics in which they excel. This academic bias
79. Id.
80. Professors Carrington and Conley seem inordinately concerned that the presence of alienated students "lessens the faculty's enjoyment of teaching." Id. at 892. The
article contains no suggestion that the students' alienation might be a justified reaction
to professors, classmates, or the school itself.
81. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (otherwise qualified applicants could not be denied admission to bar because of political beliefs).
82. The Court has stated:
[E] ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons,
there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
... Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Thus, criteria based on political or religious beliefs would interfere with the applicant's first amendment rights. Goals served
by such criteria could not be considered appropriate under any analysis.
83. See Gellhorn & Hornby, supra note 1, at 1006. The authors assert that special
consideration of applicants with special political or monetary ties cannot "withstand
constitutional scrutiny, no matter how lenient the form of judicial review ....
[T] he
classification they represent is based upon politics and privilege and is unrelated to any
legitimate, legislatively sanctioned objective of public higher education." Id.
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may not, however, reflect the needs or desires of the profession. The
academic professional is an exotic creature among his or her more
practice-oriented colleagues. Thus, the professor placing great reliance on Board Scores or GPA is arguably choosing candidates "in his
own image" as vigorously and perhaps as unjustifiably8 4 as the radical
lawyer who wants every law student to become an urban guerrilla.
Professors Thomas Shaffer and Robert Redmount, in a study of law
students, noted:
Faculty ... regard legal education as a technical enterprise. They were
opposed to any significant emphasis ... on human relations skills in
law school .... Why are faculty opposed to broader, deeper legal education? ... [L] aw teachers, like most of the rest of us, promote what
they do best .... [L] aw teachers have been rewarded for their intellectual skills .... It is perhaps understandable that this is the success
85
that they seek for their students.
The medical profession has moved beyond this attitude and has undertaken to prove the relationship between subjective noncognitive
factors and professional competence. Studies reflect a growing awareness of the importance of noncognitive factors in competent medical
care. It has been suggested that many illnesses "cure" themselves. If
this is so, the physician's personal effect may be more important in
86
most cases than any biotechnical wizardry she may command.
No such relationship between subjective noncognitive factors and
professional competence has been proven with respect to the legal
profession. But neither has the relationship of cognitive determinants
to legal-or medical--competence been proven.8 7 The courts have in
the past relied on common sense in acknowledging the necessity that
some personal traits accompany the intellectual acumen that law students and lawyers bring to their daily tasks:
[A] 11the interests of man that are comprised under the constitutional
guarantees given to "life, liberty and property" are in the professional
84. See note 90 infra.
85. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 135 (1977).
86. See Beiser, Personality Factors Influencing Medical School Achievement: A
Follow-Up Study, 42 J. MED. EDUC. 1087 (1967); Erdmann, supra note 23; Price,
Taylor, Richards, & Jacobsen, Measurement of Physicians' Performance, 39 J. MED.

EDuc. 203, 208 (1967) (" [0] ur study clearly demonstrates that performance in formal
education, as measured by grade-point averages, comes out as a factor almost completely independent of all the factors having to do with performance as a physician.");
Reinhardt & Gray. A Social Psychological Study of Attitude Change in Physicians,47 J.
MED. EDUC. 112 (1972) (suggesting reduction of stress and emphasis on behavioral sci-

ence in medical school would better meet medical and psycho-social needs of patients).
87.

See note 90 infra.

397

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:373, 1979

keeping of lawyers . . . . From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking,
of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest obser-

vances of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries,
been compendiously described as "moral character."

The law
not shown
thoroughly
wielded by

8

school's answer also lies in current events. Lawyers have
their share of moral fiber in the political world they so
dominate. 8 9 Considering the immense social power
their products, law schools may effectively argue for the

consideration of nonacademic, nonquantifiable traits among their
cognitively qualified candidates.

In addition, studies must be undertaken to determine the relevant
characteristics of professional competence and its relationship to sub-

jective noncognitive factors. Although the lack of statistical support
need not invalidate use of subjective noncognitive factors in professional school admissions, only this type of data can satisfy the number-conscious plaintiff of the Bakke and DeFunisgenre.
The relationship of intellectual ability to professional competence
in either law or medicine has not been proven.9 0 Indeed, any sugges88. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter. J.,
concurring).
89. Although the specter of Watergate is fast becoming hoary from being trotted out
at the merest whiff of legal amorality, it still serves as the most striking recent example
of ethical bankruptcy within a profession. See generally, Symposium, Legal Ethics and
Professionalism, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245 (1974); Convocation, Legal Profession, 23
DE PAUL L. REV. 633 (1974).

At least one commentator has suggested that emphasis on the LSAT in admissions has
led to such amorality because college students intent on law school admission are unconcerned with developing moral belief systems which cannot improve their Board
Scores: "What becomes lost here is a student body that brings to the law school a liberal
and philosophical awareness of the role of law in the state, the function of lawyers and
law-makers in the grander cultural and political scheme of things." D'Amato, Watergate and Legal Education: A Comment, 27 J.LEG. EDuc. 592, 593 (1975).
90. In fact, a slight negative correlation between GPA and MCAT scores and clinical competence has been demonstrated. The same study of medical students showed significant correlation between clinical competence and maturity, rapport, and motivation
as perceived by preadmission interviewers. Murden, Galloway, Reid, & Colwill,
Academic and Personal Characteristics as Predictors of Clinical Success in Medical
School, in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, PROCEEDINGS-SIXTEENTH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN MEDICAL EDUCATION 181 (1977).
Arguments over the validity of cognitive admissions schemes, exacerbated by burgeoning applicant pools, see note 2 supra, prompted the Law School Admission Council, American Association of Law Schools, National Conference of Bar Examiners, and
American Bar Foundation to sponsor a long-term study to determine what lawyers do
and how to predict who can perform those tasks most effectively. Carlson, Frederiksen,
Baird, Evans, Reilly, Werts, & Winterbottom, Becoming a Competent Lawyer, in LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, ANNUAL COUNCIL REPORT 631 (1974). The first phase in the
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tion of such a relationship is usually discouraged.9 1 Even though the
applicant's rights are such that the professional school is left free to
consider-or not consider-whatever subjective noncognitive factors
it deems most appropriate and most efficiently identified,9 2 the
study established a relationship between cognitive determinants, law school grades, and
bar examination performance. Carlson & Werts, Relationships Among Law School
Predictors,Law School Performance,and Bar Examination Results in LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, REPORTS OF LSAC-SPONSORED RESEARCH 211 (1977).

Such a result would be expected, however. The LSAT, law school tests, and bar examinations are all quantified measures which are and have been easily correlated. For example, LSAT testing items are continually matched to law school performance to increase the test's validity. Cross-validation among these indices does not prove their
relationship to professional competence, however, for this factor has not been considered in tests thus far. Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education: Special Programs
for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Traditional Criteria, 1970 TOL. L. REV.
321,333.
91. See, e.g., Erdmann, Mattson, Hutton, & Wallace, Tile Medical College Admission Test: Past, Present, Future, 46 J. MED. EDUC. 937, 942 (1971). These authors explain the statistical phenomena that make correlation difficult when an entire tested
group is near one end (in professional school admission, the high end) of a bell-shaped
curve such as that created by graphing Board Scores. "To the extent that the use of any
selection device increases the uniformity of the admitted group, the power of the device
to predict variations in subsequent performance is diminished." Id.
The experience of medical schools in this area should lessen any presumption of the
validity of measures of cognitive factors. See, e.g., Murden, Galloway, Reid, & Colwill,
supra note 90; Turner, Helper, & Kriska, Predictors of Clinical Performance, 49 J.
MED. EDUC. 338, 341 (1974) ("The MCAT Science subtest tends to correlate negatively
with judged clinical ability."). See also Wingard & Williamson, Grades as Predictorsof
Physicians' Career Performance, 48 J. MED. EDUc. 311 (1973) (reviewing studies demonstrating little or no correlation between academic and professional performance).
These authors suggest:
Selection procedures may fail to identify students with those characteristics which
might be prerequisites for successful physician performance. Instead, such procedures may identify only those who are most likely to achieve success in a current
education program. Consequently, many students selected, often on the basis of
[MCAT] scores.... lack those characteristics that may ultimately determine adequate performance, for example, professional integrity, concern for people, and
the ability to relate and communicate interest in the concerns of the community
served by the physician.
Id. at 314.
Medical school administrators have long doubted demonstrated academic ability as a
useful predictor of professional competence, and have attempted to develop other, more
satisfactory selectors. The gauntlet was laid down by one author:
With the consistent improvement in the academic qualifications of the applicant
pool, the [MCATI may be used to provide discriminations for which it was not intended. It also means that the accepted pool may become more and more homogeneous with respect to a very limited set of characteristics which may not be the
ones which society is seeking for the delivery of primary medical care ....
Erdmann, supra note 23, at 728.
92. One of the strongest arguments for exclusively cognitive decisionmaking is its
administrative efficiency. See, e.g., Brief for the Association of American Law Schools
as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 316 U.S. 312 (1974) (arguing that
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school's role in staffing a professional care system creates a moral, if

not a constitutional, duty to train individuals best suited to professional practice.9 3 The "by-the-numbers"114 admissions committee may

have a hard time justifying its professionally inadequate :5 selection
system to the noncognitively superior candidates and to the public
and profession served by the persons thus selected and trained.
IV.

CONCLUSION

"Among the qualified, how does one choose?"' . 6 As Justice Blackmun noted, that question remains for professional schools even after
the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke. In any constitutional challenge to the consideration of noncognitive factors in professional
school admissions, the school will be called upon to demonstrate the
relationship between these criteria and valid admissions goals. This
comment has examined the goals of professional schools and the ways
in which some noncognitive factors serve those goals. The number of
primarily cognitive consideration of all applicants but minorities is justified by the
large number of professional school candidates).
DeFunis' response to efficiency-oriented admissions for whites is telling when analyzed in light of the University of Washington's argument that noncognitive factors
serve professional interests:
If there is something wrong with the system of credentializing, then it should be
changed for everyone. The mere fact that DeFunis was White should not subject
him to more stringent criteria for entry to the law school than he would have if he
were Black.
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (emphasis in
original). The brief makes the mistake of equating quantified intellectualism with merit
and "higher" standards of admission, see note 29 supra, but to the extent a Bakke or DeFunis argues he was better qualified because of some relevant noncognitive trait that
administrative shortcuts caused the professional school to ignore, his argument would
have moral force. See Justice Douglas' dissent to DeFunis,416 U.S. at 331-41. See also
text accompanying note 17 supra and note 93 infra.
93. The importance of selecting students with desirable personality characteristics
is heightened by research indicating that neither law nor medical students' moral belief
systems are changed significantly by professional school training. See Rezler, Attitude
Changes During Medical School. A Review of the Literature, 49 J. MED. EDUC. 1023
(1974); Shaffer & Redmount, supra note 85, at 95, 116-17; Thielens, The Influence of
the Law School Experience on the Professional Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 587 (1969).
94.
A "by-the-numbers" selection process considers only the quantifiable aspects of
a candidate's character. See Stephenson, Why Law Schools Shouldn't Play the Numbers,
59 A.B.A.J. 492 (1973).
95. That is, it is not geared toward ensuring professional competence. See notes
21, 31 & 32 supra (discussion of the state professional school's role in fulfilling this
goal).
96. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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quantifiably qualified candidates continues to exceed the capacity of
professional schools to provide instructional opportunities. Bakke
challenges the schools either to take seriously the responsibility of selecting the best qualified students and respond with well-planned,
well-executed admissions plans reflecting professional needs, or to
take easily available data and create simplistic formulas for perpetuating an intellectual aristocracy. 97 Too many law schools have already
taken the latter route. It is hoped that this comment has demonstrated
that the benefits gained from a broad admissions policy which entails
consideration of some noncognitive factors outweigh the burdens of
predictable constitutional challenges to such a program.
Catherine Wright Smith

97. As one author notes:
There is thus created the possibility that a new kind of aristocratic class could
emerge-.

..

not based on birth or wealth but ... being composed of those blessed

with the demonstrable intelligence and a much better than average general education.... But in their new found riches, schools may have momentarily lost sight of
the fact that law is a public profession which needs men and women who can and
are willing to deal with the more mundane aspects of the profession.
Consalus, supra note 76, at 509. A similar fear was expressed in the form of a prophecy
in the question-and-answer period following the presentation of one research study in
1964:
In the next three or four years we are going to have a steady increase in the number
of applicants, and the general tendency of admissions officers in the medical
schools will be to put increasing emphasis on test scores and grades. There is a very
real possibility, therefore that the cut-off levels at which people will be admitted to
medical schools, both on the basis of MCAT scores and college grades, will be rising progressively.
It is important to question whether a dependence on this one type of criterion is
going to keep out of medical education a type of student who would become an important member of the medical profession .... Research on the definition of criteria other than grade averages and test scores which might be used for admission to
medical school is an urgent matter.
Price, Taylor, Richards, & Jacobsen, supra note 86, at 211.
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